Introduction
Do emission taxes and tradable emission permits have the same long run efficiency properties? How much inframarginal emissions should firms pay for, to maximise the efficiency of either of these instruments? The conventional view, summarised by Baumol and Oates (1988) , is as follows.
To achieve optimal exit of firms from an industry, and thus long run efficiency (maximisation of the net social benefits of abating emissions), firms must pay for all inframarginal emissions under a tax. But in contrast, some or all inframarginal emissions can remain uncharged under tradable permits, through the initial issue of free ('grandfathered') permits, without harming long run efficiency.
However, there are at least two dissenting views on long run efficiency.
Such dissent matters for policy applications where, for reasons that do not involve exit-entry effects, the form of uncertainty about marginal costs and benefits makes tax (price-based) instruments significantly more efficient than permit (quantity-based) instruments (Weitzman 1974) . Controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is probably such an application, for geophysical reasons noted by Pizer (2002) and summarised below; it is also the largest potential use of economic instruments of environmental policy.
But if, following the conventional view, exit-entry efficiency requires all inframarginal emissions to be paid for under a tax, then an efficient, pricebased instrument will be politically unacceptable, because such a tax takes large amounts of revenue away from emitters who have considerable political power. On the other hand, if one of the dissenting views is followed, and inframarginal GHG emissions can be exempted from taxation without harming exit-entry efficiency, then large revenue transfers can be avoided, and efficient, price-based control can thus be made acceptable.
The GHG case thus motivates this paper, but it does not restrict the analysis, which can apply to many different emissions. Section 2 describes, but does not explain, the detailed disagreements among the conventional and two dissenting views about the long run (exit-entry) efficiency of taxes versus tradable permits. Section 3 explains the disagreements in terms of the underlying assumptions made about the charging of inframarginal emissions, and how this affects entry and exit. Section 4 discusses the possible merits of different assumptions, with particular reference to GHG (essentially carbon dioxide) emissions, and Section 5 concludes.
As will already be clear, our framework is political economy: we hope to improve the efficiency (overall welfare outcomes) of the environmental policies that are actually chosen and promoted by the political process. The formal analysis will abstract from many issues which influence such choices.
These include innovation, uncertainty, trade, stranded capital, employment, general equilibrium effects of raising and refunding revenue, and hybrid mixtures of taxes and tradable permits. 1 However, a brief mention of the last two issues is relevant at the outset. First, there has been much debate in recent years about the general equilibrium (often called 'double dividend') effects of tax and tradable permit schemes. Broadly, this debate has concluded that it is more efficient for all such schemes to charge for all inframarginal emissions, so that revenues thereby raised can be used to reduce existing distortionary taxes (see for example Goulder, Parry and Burtraw 1997, or Bovenberg 1999 for a review). This argument is quite different to the entry-exit effects which concern us here, so discussion of general equilibrium effects is deferred until much later. Second, it is well-1. See for example Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) , who estimate empirically all these issues except innovation, uncertainty and mixed instruments, for the case of controlling carbon dioxide emissions in Denmark.
known that a hybrid of taxes and tradable permits is possible and may be desirable under uncertainty (Roberts and Spence 1976; Baumol and Oates 1988, pp75-77) . But for simplicity, discussion of this is deferred until the very end, and taxes and tradable permits are treated separately until then.
Three views on taxes versus tradable permits
The disagreements among the three views are most simply seen by starting with the 'uniform' case, which includes GHG emissions, where emissions from firms in different locations mix completely before having any environmental impact. The value of environmental damage D, caused by an industry of n identical, perfectly competitive firms 2 each with a level e of emissions (measured in say tonnes per year), then depends only on total
The first, conventional view of the efficiency of taxes and tradable permits in the uniform case was laid down as the textbook approach by Baumol and Oates (1988, Chs. 12 and 14) . It has been confirmed by recent texts such as Hanley et al. (1997, pp72-5 and 133-6) , Lesser et al. (1997, pp157-9) and Xepapadeas (1997, pp16-9) , and is taken as given by many non-economists (see for example Wiener 1999 of a positive e 0 in the case of taxes, but to fully accept it for tradable permits.
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A second, less common view was proposed by Carlton and Loury (1980) for taxes (which were actually on output not emissions, but the same result holds for emission taxes), and by Kling and Zhao (2000) for tradable emission permits. According to the latter's analysis, which we revisit below, for example by Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) and Stavins (1998) . It is also poles apart from current plans in many countries for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Variants of the second view are found in Cramton and Kerr (1999) , who argued for fully auctioned permits, but for reasons of transaction efficiency (to avoid the rent-seeking costs of deciding on the distribution of permits) and equity, rather than allocative efficiency; and in Spulber (1985) , who considered only pure Pigovian taxes and fully auctioned permits, for reasons of equity. The third, also minority, view on the long run efficiency of taxes versus tradable permits was proposed by Pezzey (1992) and Farrow (1995 Farrow ( , 1999 .
They independently claimed that payment (1) can achieve long run allocative efficiency, for both taxes and tradable permits, irrespective of the value of e 0 . This then allows either tax thresholds or free permits to be distributed flexibly, by whatever criterion is needed to secure political adoption of either economic instrument. However, if the criterion is effectively that the instrument should leave an industry's profits unchanged, this need not mean giving thresholds or free permits to cover all of the controlled level of emissions. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, Pezzey and Park (1998) noted that carbon-fuel suppliers as a whole have considerable market power, and hence will enjoy large rents if given free permits for all their carbon sales while total carbon sales are simultaneously cut back by the permit scheme. Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) quantified this idea using a computable general equilibrium of the US economy, and found that carbon suppliers need only a small fraction of their required tradable permits to be free, in order for the permit policy to leave their profits unchanged.
The different assumptions underlying each view
Which of the three views is right? All of them are, in that all of them draw correct conclusions from their underlying (though sometimes implicit) As analysis below will remind us, a lump sum right has no effect on a firm's economic profit from producing, in the same way that the amount of land that a competitive firm owns, rather than rents, has no effect.
With this terminology, the differences between the assumptions made about te 0 by the three views can be summarised in the following 
If n is the number of firms as before, P(nq) is the industry's product price, and c(q,a) is each firm's total cost of output, then a producing firm's accounting profit is P(nq)q − c(q,a) − t[e(q,a)−e 0 −e 1 ]. However, the right e 0 is valuable whether or not the firm produces, so the accounting profit if the firm shuts down is te 0 , not zero. (The profit te 0 would come either from payments by the control authority in the tax case, or from the firm renting out its unused permits.) The economic profit from producing, used to make entry-exit decisions, is then the difference between these two sums:
The equilibrium of an industry of price-taking firms is given by π = 0, ∂π/∂q = P(nq) − c q (q,a) − te q (q,a) = 0, and
−∂π/∂a = c a (q,a) + te a (q,a) = 0.
If the total cost of environmental damage is D(n,e), more general than the D(ne) assumed above in Section 2, then the government's optimisation problem (ignoring general equilibrium efficiency effects from revenue raised)
is to choose policies so that the resulting q, a and n maximise the social (q,a) ). This requires the first order conditions
−(∂u/∂a)/n = c a (q,a) + D e (n,e)e a (q,a)/n = 0 (7)
Comparing the two sets of conditions (π = 0 and (4)- (5), with (6)- (8)), it is straightforward to show that the optimal government policy is t* = D e /n; e 0 * is indeterminate;
Here, e* is the optimal level of emissions per firm; q, a and n are implicitly also at their optimal levels; and the elasticities of pollution damage with respect to each firm's emission, and to the number of firms, are respectively defined as in Kling and Zhao: The efficient and acceptable policy thus has three elements:
(i) a per unit emission price t* as in (9). This is created directly by a tax, or indirectly by the market price of a tradable permit;
(ii) an emission right e 0 *. This should be set flexibly, and perhaps individually, for existing firms, at whatever intermediate value 0 ≤ e 0 * ≤ e* is acceptable (not just the extreme values e 0 * = 0 or e 0 * = e*), given the balance of political, and general equilibrium efficiency, considerations. However, e 0 * should be zero for all new firms. The political considerations should include the effects of the industry's market power, noted at the end of Section 2 but omitted from the above model; and also perhaps the (distortionary, but persuasive) case for raising some revenue that is 'earmarked' for public spending on emissions abatement (see for example Teja and Bracewell-Milnes 1991 and Wilkinson 1994) . The general equilibrium efficiency consideration is the 'double dividend' effect, noted in the Introduction but also omitted from our model, whereby lowering e 0 *, and thus raising more revenue to spend on reducing existing, non-environmental taxes, raises overall welfare. A final consideration is to create and distribute the rights e 0 * on some historical basis, to minimise the rent-seeking costs that any legislative process of defining scheme (2) will inevitably generate;
(iii) an emission subsidy level e 1 * (perhaps negative, since ε (9) is from Kling and Zhao, and it corrects for the difference between the number of firms and emissions per firm in determining total pollution damage. n , so by (10), the optimal subsidy level e 1 * is zero. However, the emission right e 0 * remains a vital tool, crucially affected by political considerations, to ensure that an economic approach to pollution control is acceptable and thus actually adopted. 
Discussion of assumptions made about tax thresholds or free permits
In this section, we aim to compare objectively the assumptions, clarified by the above analysis, that underlie the three views about taxes and tradable permits. This comparison focuses especially on the expected administrative, political and economic characteristics of a control instrument which was analysed above but does not yet exist in practice: the emission tax threshold which is a property right rather than a subsidy. Our conclusion is simple but contentious, and is worth stating now: Rather than being written off as counterintuitive, or impossible because it has never yet been implemented, the tax-threshold-as-property-right, an idea first proposed by Mumy (1980) , deserves further investigation, particularly for GHG control.
The first step towards this conclusion is to argue that whenever institutional assumptions are made about treating tax thresholds or free permits as subsidies or property rights, they should be explicit. The assumption that a positive emission tax threshold e 0 in (1) lowers a firm's average cost, and hence gives a higher profit which encourages firm entry (see for example Baumol and Oates, , is widespread, but is often implicit. It amounts to a decision to treat the tax threshold as a (production-7. For the uniform pollution case (i.e. with e 1 * = 0), it has been shown (for example by Goulder, Parry and Burtraw 1997) that if marginal environmental benefits are below some critical value, then as a result of general equilibrium effects, even a small amount of abatement using a non-revenue-raising instrument (where e 0 * = e*) reduces efficiency. In such a case, it might be that no level of e 0 * can be found, for either taxes or permits, that is both acceptable, and results in (2) improving efficiency. dependent) subsidy, while the same author often treats free tradable permits as property rights. This decision should be clarified and explained: it may be a good description of how current tax and permit schemes work, but they need not work that way forever.
The next step is to compare the second view of taxes and permits against the first, conventional view. Should free tradable permits be treated as subsidies, and thus cause excessive entry and long run inefficiency, as Kling and Zhao assume? Such treatment is always possible, and indeed it happened in the US lead trading program of the 1980s. Then, firms received permits based explicitly on their current output level, and thus had an incentive to stay in business to collect the implicit subsidy generated by free permits. But unless the efficiency loss from such entry-exit distortion is smaller than the cost savings from not having to administer permits owned by firms no longer producing, there is no need to create such a scheme.
Indeed, the US sulphur allowance trading scheme that started in 1990, already mentioned in Section 2, effectively (if not legally) treats free permits as property rights rather than as subsidies.
The third step in our argument is about the empirical relevance of tax thresholds to GHG control, economically the world's biggest pollution control problem. Though there is great uncertainty about both the costs and benefits of control, the stock effect caused by the long atmospheric lives of most GHGs almost certainly makes the marginal benefit cost curve much flatter than the marginal control cost curve (Pizer 2002 , Philibert 2002 and this argument may well also apply to other long-lived stock pollutants).
Therefore, following Weitzman (1974) , it would be better to use a tax-based instrument to control the price of GHG emissions, than to use permits to control the quantity of emissions. However, this observation has had no effect on the international debate on GHG control until recently. Arguably because of the conventional view of the efficiency of taxes versus tradable permits, widespread proposals for carbon taxes in the early 1990s considered only pure taxes, and ignored the possibility of tax thresholds. (As noted by Ekins and Speck 1999, many proposals exempted key emitters altogether, but that is different.) Political resistance to the amounts of revenue that such pure taxes would raise was too great to be overcome. So the 1997 Kyoto Protocol instead adopted tradable permits as the economic instrument of choice, because free permits obviously raise no revenue. However, the great uncertainty in the likely future permit price − precisely the point of the and comparisons of GHG permits and taxes typically consider only pure taxes, albeit with tax revenue refunded by reduced income or other taxes (see for example Svendsen et al 2001) . So the GHG case shows that it is indeed crucial for policy analysis to consider a full range of economic instruments, including taxes; and that making taxes politically acceptable requires the use of thresholds, to avoid the huge revenue transfers from wellorganised, carbon-intensive industries that pure taxes cause.
The fourth and fifth arguments for at least investigating tax-thresholdsas-rights are defensive, and address their perceived or actual weaknesses in ways that go beyond allocative efficiency. The fourth tackles a common criticism of their possible administrative costs. For the control authority to pay out te 0 forever to firms that have shut down, as required by e 0 being a full property right, would obviously be costly to administer. This is particularly true if international transfers of rights are allowed, as might occur with GHG control. But it is not at all clear why such perpetual payment should be infeasible, as Baumol and Oates (1988, p216) suggested.
If a government can pay interest on perpetual bonds, a bank can pay interest forever on its accountholders' balances, and a limited company can pay dividends forever on its shareholders' balances, why cannot a pollution control authority pay at its currently chosen rate t forever to legal holders of e 0 in emission tax thresholds?
8 But if such administration is indeed too expensive, then added rules, like a minimum holding size or maximum holding life for threshold owners which are not producing firms, could reduce the cost. Or, one could justifiably go further and make thresholds dependent on production like normal tax credits (so they are then no longer property rights), if the resulting loss of exit-entry efficiency is smaller than the saving achieved in administrative costs (Farrow 1999 the firm pays t(e−e 0 ) if e ≥ fe 0 , for some 0 < f ≤ 1; )
but pays −t(1−f)e 0 if e < fe 0 . )
This would limit the authority's maximum payment to a firm to t(1−f)e 0 , and thus prevent payment altogether if f = 1. Such a limit would give some firms too little incentive to keep reducing emissions, so again some allocative efficiency is lost; but this might be justified if such loss is less than the welfare (and political) cost avoided of the authority having to raise other taxes to fund a net budgetary cost.
Conclusion: the need to consider a full range of instruments, and a full range of costs
Our aim has been to show that the differences among three distinct views, about the long run efficiencies of emission tax and tradable emission permit schemes, can be explained by different underlying assumptions made about the thresholds or free permits built into such schemes. Only if thresholds are treated as lump sum property rights rather than subsidies, can a tax-with-thresholds scheme achieve long run efficiency, and thus be added to the list of schemes which can be both efficient, and acceptable because they avoid raising too much revenue from politically powerful emitters. In the last section we built up an argument for taking such a thresholds-asrights scheme seriously, by debating various aspects of institutional design.
However, we are arguing only for further investigation, not for definitely adopting a scheme of tax-with-thresholds-as-rights, even for the case of GHG emissions where the probable flatness of the marginal benefits of emission control favours price-based over quantity-based control. For one thing, we have already given administrative or budgetary cost reasons why the pure designs (1) and (2), which are allocatively efficient for uniform and non-uniform emissions respectively, may need to be modified. For another, there are doubtless important legal questions to be answered, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, of which we have said nothing. Lastly, there is a whole class of hybrid economic instruments of control, which we mentioned in the Introduction but have ignored since. It now deserves further comment.
Roberts and Spence (1976; see also Baumol and Oates pp.75-7) extended
Weitzman's analysis of instrument choice under uncertainty, to show that a hybrid mixture of taxes and tradable permits is possible, and can be more efficient than either pure taxes or pure tradable permits. For the case of GHG control, Wilcoxen (1997a, 1997b) and Pizer (1997 Pizer ( , 2002 ) have proposed such a hybrid system. Control would be by tradable permits, but permit price uncertainty would be capped by governments selling unlimited permits once some ceiling price is reached. 9 Pizer (2002) , who follows the conventional view on tax thresholds, finds that "This system turns out to be only slightly more efficient than a pure tax system. However, it achieves this efficiency while preserving the political appeal of permits: the ability to flexibly distribute the rents associated with emission rights."
Such a mixed system may well turn out to be the most workable, efficient and acceptable system for some pollutants in some places. But we have argued that tax thresholds can also flexibly distribute the rents created by an 9. The Roberts and Spence scheme also requires governments to buy permits once a floor price is reached, but this is omitted from recent proposals. Pizer gives the dynamic inefficiency of subsidies as a reason, citing the Baumol and Oates argument.
We have contested this argument in Section 4; but even so, there would also be the problem of how governments would pay for such buying at the floor price.
emissions control policy, and so may deserve consideration for other pollutants and places. Our overall conclusion is that policy design needs to consider both a full range of instruments (taxes, permits, and hybrids of taxes and permits, with intermediate levels of tax thresholds or free permits, and possible limits on market incentives), and a full range of costs (allocative, administrative, and 'political'), before the best instrument for any particular application can be found.
